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Abstract
This paper explores the link between congressional actions and public attitudes about 
government responsiveness, public efficacy, and public trust in government.  
Congressional actions are moves by members of Congress that are potentially 
consequential to public opinion.  The theory contends that actions taken by Congress 
influence these perspectives on government within an alert stratum of the public. This 
relationship is demonstrated by employing a pooled time-series logistical regression 
modeling data that come from the American National Election Studies merged with 
historical actions data. The findings support the contention that increased actions by 
Congress increase public efficacy and trust in government, and also improve public 
attitudes about government responsiveness.
Habermas (1989) defines the public sphere as a domain of our social life in which such a 
thing as public opinion can be formed, and that access to the public sphere is open in 
principle to all citizens.  He contends that a portion of the public sphere is constituted in 
every conversation in which private persons come together to form a public.  While 
Habermas contends that the state is the counterpart to the public sphere, and is not 
actually part of it.  Foucault (1982) challenges the idea of coercion-free space where open 
deliberation occurs, arguing that the state has influence over the realm of deliberation.  In 
an empirical examination, Mayhew (2000) concurs with Foucault, arguing that the 
actions of the realm where power resides, the Congress, have an impact on the public 
sphere, but Mayhew contends that Congress is actually a part of the public sphere.  This 
study offers empirical evidence that the actions of members of Congress affect public
opinion implying that the public sphere consists of a dynamic relationship between state 
and public.  The evidence here supports the contention that the actions of Congress are an 
integral part of the formation of public opinion, and that, Congress is actually a part of 
the open deliberation.
To deliberate is to think about and discuss issues purposefully before reaching a 
decision.  Both Congress and the public discuss issues and come to decisions, and it can 
be argued that these discussions are not independent of each other, but rather, they are 
both part of the same conversation.  Congress and the public respond to each other.  
While most previous research on the dynamic between Congress and the public focuses 
on constituency influence on Congress (Miller and Stokes 1963; Fiorina 1974; Erikson 
1978; Achen 1978; Bartels 1991; McIver et al 1994; Stimson et al 1995; Hill et al 1994; 
Wood and Hinton-Andersson 1998), an understanding of the effects the institution and its 
members has on the public provides a more complete explanation of the dynamic.  If the 
actions of members of Congress(MCs) affect the way the public perceives government, 
then it is likely that it will affect the way they behave, and in turn, affect the way 
Congress behaves.  Therefore, the dynamic between Congress and the citizenry moves in
multiple directions.
The central puzzle of this paper involves exploring the dynamic between 
Congress and public opinion. More directly the following question will be addressed: 
How do “congressional actions” affect individual citizen's attitudes about government?   
Congressional Actions, as defined by Mayhew (2000), are “moves by MCs that are to a 
significant degree autonomous and consequential-or at least potentially consequential-and 
are noticed by an alert stratum of the public exactly because of their perceived current or 
potential consequentiality.”  These moves consist of things such as speeches, filibusters, 
amendments introduced, hearings conducted, presidential bids, maneuvering someone 
else's presidential nominee, cabinet appointments, considerations for nomination to the 
Presidency, corruption accusations, or even simply, statements about other's leadership 
qualities.  While there may be many more implications, this paper addresses the 
consequentiality of these “actions” on public attitudes about government responsiveness, 
levels of political trust, and levels of political external efficacy.  External efficacy is 
defined as  the citizen's evaluation of the level of system responsiveness.  These three 
phenomena are intrinsically linked because they all address broad attitudes about 
government, and it is unlikely that one would be politically efficacious but have low trust 
in government, or have high trust in government but feel poorly about government 
responsiveness.
This study hypothesizes a positive relationship between Congressional actions 
and the aforementioned perspectives on government.  The contention here is that 
increased activity in Congress may be interpreted by the public as increased 
representation.   A busy Congress is perceived as a representative Congress.  Further, a 
busy Congress is likely to be getting more media attention and the relationship of actions 
to perspectives should be strongest among those who are most attentive.  The argument is 
that there is a baseline normal level of congressional activity and public attitudes, and as 
the magnitude of this activity fluctuates around the baseline, the public's attitudes on 
Congress will fluctuate in the same direction.  Most models of public opinion that seek to 
explain fluctuations in public attitudes consider individual socio-psychological factors 
but do not consider the actual behavior of representatives.  Efficacy, trust, and attitudes 
about responsiveness are all about perceptions of the actions of government.  Therefore, 
it makes sense that the actions of government would have an effect of attitudes about the 
actions of government.
While the body of literature regarding the “national policy mood” does not 
directly propose the same idea, it does provide a framework from which the fluctuating 
attitudes can be understood.  Stimson (1999) defines “policy mood” as shared feelings 
that move over time and circumstance.  Many have used this concept to explain the 
nature of political change and the relationship between government and the public 
(Kellstedt 2000; Flemming and Wood 1997; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; 
Jacoby 1994), among others.  This study asserts that this general disposition is in part a 
result of affect towards Congress in the form of attitudes about responsiveness, efficacy 
levels, and trust government.  The fluctuations in attitudes can be described as a “national 
mood”.  As expectations are exceeded or they are not reached, the public's feeling about 
Congress as a whole is affected.
Converse (1964) suggested that the public is politically un-attentive, and 
therefore, it is unlikely that the nuances of congressional activity would seep into the 
public consciousness in any major way.  Others have suggested that the public is more 
aware than Converse contended (Stokes 1966; Brody and Page 1972; Popkin 1994).  The 
contention here is that those who have public interest, or follow government and public 
affairs, deliberate within their networks, forming a general disposition in the process.  
This deliberation may occur in the workplace, as well as in churches (Verba et al 1993).  
Also, deliberation may occur at home with family (Jennings 1983), and with spouses 
(Niemi et al 1977).  The theory contends that those who are most attentive are most likely
to deliberate and will be most affected by the actions of Congress.
Perspectives on Government
Mayhew (2000) proposed that congressional actions play a role in the public sphere in his 
unique work America's Congress.  His approach fuses a traditional theoretical perspective 
with an empirical one, but the uniqueness comes from the dataset he uses to make his 
argument.  This dataset includes actions by individual members of Congress since its first 
sessioni.  While Mayhew's data collection is quite impressive, the full potential of these 
data is not maximized.  He presents the argument that actions are relevant in the public 
sphere, but then does not offer any systematic test of how these actions interact with the 
electorate.  An empirical examination of the nature of the dynamic between congressional 
actions and attitudes about responsiveness, political trust, and external efficacy is one 
step towards understanding the dynamic between Congress and public opinion.
Miller and Stokes’ (1963) seminal work on constituency influence was the 
beginning of our understanding of political responsiveness.  After guiding the study of 
representation through the 1960's, their study generated criticism, both theoretically and 
methodologically.  Erikson (1978) challenges their findings, asserting that constituency 
influence is actually greater than they purported.  He asserts that their findings were 
inaccurate as a result of sampling error, and further, that congressional responsiveness is 
a function of constituency influence guided by parties and elections.  Bartels (1991), and 
McIver, Erikson, and Wright (1994), along with Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson (1995) 
all find that public opinion does influence congressional behavior.  These studies seek to 
explain responsiveness from the bottom up, while this study seeks to explain attitudes 
about responsiveness, and government in general, from the top down.  The level of
responsiveness is likely to affect attitudes about responsiveness, and the contention here 
is that increased actions may be perceived as increased responsiveness leading to higher 
efficacy and trust.  The relationship is multi-directional.
The nature of individual efficacy in the public has been explored, but the focus 
has primarily been on its impact on participation levels (Kellstedt 2000; Verba, Burns, 
and Schlozman 1997; Wolman and Stouder 1991; Wolfsfeld 1986; Pollock III 1983; 
Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Shaffer 1981).  The general argument of these authors is 
that those with higher levels of efficacy are more likely to participate.  From the opposite 
direction, Finkel (1987, 1985) proposes that participation leads to higher efficacy.  While 
all of these theories help to bring clarity to the concept of efficacy and its implications, 
they fail to adequately address causal factors of efficacy levels.  Shrivastava (1989) 
highlights some of the potential causes of differing efficacy levels by comparing students 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India; his research suggests that factors 
such as income and differing environments affect the levels of efficacy.
The influence that the behavior of officials has on efficacy has been explored by 
studies contending that negative campaigning decreases efficacy (Ansolabehere et al 
1994), which supports the argument that actions taken by public officials affect 
individual attitudes in the electorate.  The theory in this study does not challenge 
previously asserted causal factors of efficacy, but rather seeks to address another 
potential explanatory variable- actions- as a supplement to these previously asserted 
causal factors.
Miller(1974) argues that levels of trust in government can be explained by 
individual alienation from the two parties positions on issues, while Citrin argues that 
lowered levels of trust can be explained by dissatisfaction with the incumbent president.  
Erber and Lau (1990) contend that both of these perspectives can be supported, but the 
effects are contingent on which cognitive constructs are accessible.  This study seeks to 
expand on this notion, arguing that increased levels of public interest make the actions of 
Congress cognitively accessible, and this contributes to levels of trust, as well as efficacy 
and attitudes about responsiveness.  This dynamic can best be described as a flow of 
information between Congress and the public.
Data and Methods 
Data
The attitude indicators attitudes about responsiveness, external efficacy, trust in 
government and all control variables are obtained from the American National Election 
Studies (ANES), made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political 
and Social Research. Data from 1964-1988 (every two years, N=24,263) were the only 
years included in the analysis because the attitudinal measures collectively spanned this 
period.  The congressional actions data were merged with the ANES dataset, and were 
obtained from David Mayhew's website 
(http://pantheon.yale.edu/dmayhew/datasets.html).
This dataset includes 2,304 cases that Mayhew painstakingly extracted from 5 
“general” history texts and 33 volumes of “era” history.  Mayhew scanned the index of 
each text for MCs names, cross-checking this with the Biographical Directory
of the American Congress.  He then looked under the entry to see if the text contained an 
action carried out by the respective MC, and then tagged this as an item for the dataset.  
Finally, he read each volume, cover to cover, to identify any actions that he may have 
missed.
Mayhew's subjectivity is imposed on some of the decisions to include or exclude 
certain actions when the texts includes quotes from MCs that were not particularly 
noteworthy, but for the most part it was a straightforward process.  It also required 
Mayhew to synthesize some of the discrepancies between the texts.  These biases are not 
particularly threatening to the validity of this study because the actions will be aggregated 
and the bulk of the items in the dataset were not controversial.  Mayhew also offered a 
code to distinguish the number of texts any particular item appeared in, but this study 
utilizes all of the actions in the dataset.  Each action was coded individually to correspond 
with their respective MC.  The assumption is that if the action was important enough to 
be included in a historical text, then it is likely that it was important enough for 
individuals within the public to take notice penetrating the public sphere.  In addition, the 
historical texts utilized data gathered from newspapers, which supports the argument that 
these actions penetrated the public realm where deliberation occurs.
Methods
The unit of analysis is the individual, with the actions indicator serving as a contextual 
variable, as it is constant across each legislative cycle.  This contextual effect can be 
methodologically thought of in the same way as a “national mood” indicator.  It is an 
aggregate stimulus that each respondent experiences and processes individually.  The 
effects are tested from context to context.  A series of graphical examples that exhibit the 
pattern between actions and the attitude indicators will be exhibited, followed by three 
pooled time-series ordered logistical regression models that that include the outcome 
variables attitude about government responsiveness, external efficacy, trust in 
government, modeled as a function of the total number of actions, public interest, party 
identification, the difference in affect toward the parties, socio-economic status, and 
prospective personal financial situation.  These models also include the interaction of the 
total number of actions and public interest.  These interactions serve to address the 
contention that the effect of actions will be more intense for those that are more attentive 
to public affairs.  Because the actions are constant across all respondents in each 
legislative cycle the variation being measured for this indicator is the mean change in 
attitude about government responsiveness, external efficacy, and trust in government.
Because it is not reasonable to assume that the errors in this time-series regression 
are independent, the correlation within each vector of the explanatory variables and 
outcome variables was plotted using correlograms to visually determine if there is 
autocorrelation within each vector (see Hibbs 1974; Fox 1997;for an application also see 
Oren 1996).  Assuming a first-order autocorrelation process the correlograms indicated 
no discernible pattern of decay exponentially towards 0, and therefore, the values of these 
variables at time(t) are not dependent on the values at time(t-1).  It is not necessary to lag 
any of these variables, and a pooled time-series ordered logistical regression is suitable.
Operationalization of Outcome Variables
Attitudes about responsiveness were measured using an additive index.  Respondents 
were asked the following questions: 1) Over the years, how much attention do you feel 
the government pays to what the people think when it decides what to do -- a good deal, 
some, or not much? and 2) How much do you feel that having elections makes the 
government pay attention to what the people think, a good deal, some, or not much?  To 
construct this variable, these components were first recoded as not much = 0, some = 50,
and a good deal =100.  The recoded values were then summed and divided by the number 
of items, and then rounded to 0, 25, 50, 75, and 100.  A factor analysis indicates that 
these items cluster around one factor, and reliability analysis indicates that they can be 
combined ( = 0 .547).  While this alpha level is not extremely high, it is sufficient to 
create an additive index of these items.
External efficacy was measured by reading the respondent the following 
statements and asking them to state whether the agreed, disagreed, or neither agreed or 
disagreed with the statement: 1) I don't think public officials care much what people like 
me think, and 2) People like me have no say in what government does.ii  The responses 
were coded a 0, 100, and 50 respectively.  They were then added together and divided by 
the total number of items.  The summed totals were then rounded to 0,
25, 50, 75, and 100.   Factor analysis indicates that these items cluster along one factor, 
and reliability analysis supports creating an additive index ( = 0 .606).
Trust in government was also measured using an additive index.  The respondents 
were asked the following questions: 1) How much of the time do you think you can trust 
the government in Washington to do what is right -- just about always, most of the time 
or only some of the time? 2) Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few 
big interests, is looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the 
people? 3) Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in 
taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it? And 4) Do you think that quite a 
few of the people running the government are (1964-1972: a little) crooked, not very 
many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked (1964-1972: at all)?  The 
responses were ordered to have the same direction and then they were summed 
accordingly.  To construct this variable, the responses were recoded as follows: 1) 
1=0,2=33,3=67,4=100; 2) 1=0, 2=100; 3) and 4) 1=0,2=50,3=100.  The recoded values 
are then totaled and divided by the number and divided by the number of items.  These 
values were then rounded to 0, 25, 50, 75, and 100.  Again factor analysis indicates that 
these items cluster along the same factor, and reliability analysis confirms the 
appropriateness of creating an additive index ( = 0 .694).
--insert Table 1 about here--
As previously mentioned, attitudes about responsiveness, external efficacy, and 
trust in government are all intrinsically linked because they each broadly address attitudes 
about government.  Each are correlated with the other and group along one factor 
supporting the contention that there is some underlying commonality between them (refer 
to Table 1).
Operationalization of Explanatory Variables
The first and primary explanatory variable used in the analyses is the MC Actions (See 
Appendix for a complete listing of all of the categories of “action” types).  The Actions 
were summed to obtain the total number of actions by legislative cycle.  The actions in 
the years directly preceding the ANES year of study were combined.  For example, 1966 
ANES data was merged with the summed actions from 1965 and 1966.  This was done 
because it is expected that the effects of the actions of MCs in the time directly preceding 
and leading up to the time of the ANES survey will drive citizens' attitudes because these 
actions are at the forefront of the consciousness of individuals.  The assertion is that the 
accumulation of recent actions culminates into an effect on public attitudes, and that 
changing legislative cycles are an appropriate point from which to survey this effect.
Public interest is intended to gauge the attentiveness of the public.  There was no 
media exposure item in the dataset that was constant across the time period being 
examined, but public interest indirectly measures media exposure.  This measure also 
more directly addresses attentiveness to government affairs than a general media 
exposure indicator.  It is operationalized using the following question: Some people seem 
to follow (1964: think about)what's going on in government and public affairs most of the 
time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested.  Would 
you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, 
some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?  The idea here is that actions are 
likely to have the greatest effect on those that pay more attention to government.
Party identification was simply measured by asking the respondent which party 
they felt closest to, and then responses were coded as Democrat, Independent, 
Republican, and Apolitical.  Dummy variables were created for Democrats, 
Independents, and Republicans.  The apolitical response is left out as a reference
category.  This indicator is included as a control because it is unlikely that high actions 
by the opposing party of the respondent's identification will have a positive effect on their 
assessments of government.  As a further control of party identification effects, the 
difference in the affect toward the parties was included.  The respondents were asked to 
rate how they felt about each of the parties on a scale with 0 being the worse and 100 
being the best.  The difference was computed by subtracting the Republican affect from 
the Democratic affect, and then the absolute value of the computation was used.  This 
simple mathematical measure is intended to ascertain individual's level of concern for 
which party is in control.  If the difference is large, then it is likely that these respondents 
would be more favorable of one of the parties.  In addition, the sign of the difference 
indicates which party they are more favorable towards.  Higher favorability of Democrats 
will result in a positive sign and higher favorability of the Republicans results in a 
negative sign.
Socio-economic status was measured using an index of level of education and 
income.  Education was coded as follows: 1) Grade school or less (0-8 grades), 2) High 
school (12 grades or fewer, including non-college training if applicable), 3) Some 
College (13grades or more but no degree), and 4) College or advanced degree.  Income 
was self-reported and categorized as follows: 1) 0 to 16th  percentile, 2) 17th to 33rd  
percentile, 3) 34th  to 67th  percentile, 4.) 68th to 95th  percentile, and 5) 96th  to 100th  
percentile.  The responses clustered along the same factor, and reliability analysis 
indicated that an additive index was suitable ( = 0.563).  This was included as a control 
because previous research has identified a positive relationship between income and 
efficacy (Shrivastava 1989)( r =0.300, p ≤  01). There is also a positive relationship 
between socio-economic status and attitudes about responsiveness ( r =0.115, p ≤  0.01), 
as well as a positive relationship with trust in government (r=0.034, p ≤  0.01).  While the 
magnitude of these relationships is not large, it is sufficient enough to include as a 
control.
Prospective personal financial situation was included as a control because 
previous research has indicated a relationship between economic expectations and 
congressional approval (Durr et al 1997; Parker 1977).  This indicator was measured 
using the following question: Now looking ahead and thinking about the next few years, 
do you expect your financial situation will stay about the way it is now, get better, or get 
worse (1964), and Now looking ahead--do you think that a year from now (1966-1970: 
you people; 1972,1974: you [and your family]; 1976 and later: you [and your family 
living here]) will be better off financially or worse off, or just about the same as now?  
The order of the responses was recoded to make interpretation more clear by putting the 
stay about the same as a middle category, with worse off as the first category.  The 
variation in the indicator was unavoidable, but the concept being measured is still has the 
same substance.
--insert Figure 1 about here--
Findings
In order to show that actions matter, it is first necessary to show that there is some 
fluctuation in the magnitude of actions across time.  The argument is that individuals 
have some expectation of Congress and when this expectation is exceeded or not reached 
this affects individuals' assessment of the institution. These expectations are dependent 
on the normal level of output and activity of the institution.  Figure 1 provides a visual 
representation of the number of actions per legislative cycle.
While Figure 1 allows us to look at the changes in the number of actions by 
legislative cycle, it does not provide a good representation of the shifting dynamic of 
actions and attitudes about government together.  Figure 2 allows us to examine these 
relationships.  Because actions and the attitudes indicators are measured on different 
scales, with the attitude scales being ordinal and bounded by 100 and actions are 
continuous exceeding100 for some
\begin{figure}\caption{\textsc{Actions, Efficacy, Trust, and Attitudes about 
Responsiveness}}
\begin{center}
\epsfig{file=actionsline.ps,height=3.7in,width=5in}
\end{center}
\end{figure}
legislative cycles, summing the values for each variable per legislative cycle allows us to 
see how they move together.  Upon examining Figure 2, it appears that there is a 
relationship wherein increasing and decreasing actions correspond with the summed 
perspectives for actions. Because these indicators are summed,  Figure 2 exhibits the 
aggregate contextual effects.  Also, it is important to remember that these data were 
organized to include the attitudes of the respondents immediately following the recorded 
legislative cycle actions.  It is expected that it take time for these actions to penetrate the 
collective consciousness of the public.
Referring to Figure 1 and Figure 2, there is a clear rise in actions from 1972-
1974, and then a huge jump in1978. These are the periods of Watergate and the Carter 
administration.  It seems counter-intuitive that attitudes about government would improve 
in these periods because the public was clearly not favorable of either presidency, or at 
least not favorable of Nixon after the Watergate affair, but the graphs indicate that this is 
the case.  This indicates that while assessments of the President are likely to be low, 
evaluations of Congress are not.  The negative circumstances surrounding the presidents 
in these periods may provide an opportunity for Congress to separate itself from the 
presidency and affect the nature of its public image.
Congressional investigations into the Watergate scandal could give MCs the 
image of ardent representatives of the public interest, leading to rising evaluations of 
government.  In the period from1972-1974 there were a total of twelve investigative 
actions (Mayhew 2000).  As a result of the allegations by Woodward and Bernstein in the 
Washington Post, Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic majority leader, decided that 
there was sufficient need for a select Senate investigative committee in 1973 
(Blum1991).  He appointed Senator Samuel Ervin, Jr. as the chairman of this committee 
and this action was included in the dataset.  The public potentially perceived this action, 
as well as the actions taken by Ervin, as actions seeking to represent their interest.
Why such an extreme boost of actions in 1978?  As can be seen in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2} the legislative cycle preceding the1977-78 cycle was one of extremely low 
actions. Of particular interest is the shift of what Mayhew (2000) refers to as opposition 
actions or actions aimed at thwarting, or impairing the standing of a presidential 
administration.  In the 1975-76 cycle there were only two opposition actions, while in the 
1977-78 cycle there were 20, or ten times as many.  Furthermore, in the 1975-76cycle 
both of the opposition actions were carried out by members of Congress that were 
Democrats, the opposing party of the president at the time, Gerald Ford.  Conversely, 
80% of the opposition actions in the 1977-78 cycle were carried out by members of 
Carter's own party.  The logic of why this would lead to improving evaluations of 
government is that Carter was not a particularly popular president (Gallup Poll shows 
approval ratings dipping as low as 28%), and the public could see the actions of Congress 
in opposition to Carter as a representative response to their disfavor of the President.
In 1978, Edward Kennedy, a Democrat considered to be particularly more liberal 
than President Carter engaged in a bitter dispute with the President over health insurance. 
Kennedy developed a health insurance plan in opposition to Carter's proposal. Cohn 
(1978) stated in the Washington Post that “the plan (health insurance) grew out of 
Kennedy's and labor's dissatisfaction with proposals issued by Carter”.  It is likely that 
this conflict between Kennedy and Carter, where Kennedy supported a more liberal plan, 
could be perceived by liberal individuals as congressional representation of their 
interests.
The differences between Kennedy and Carter were publicized well beyond the 
health insurance issues. One of the actions included in the dataset was an attack on Carter 
by Kennedy at a party conference.  The accumulation of these opposition actions led 
Carter to go so far as to deny that the differences with Kennedy were indicative of a 
schism within the Democratic Party, while Kennedy contended that these differences 
were fundamental (Tolchin 1978).  This conflict is an example of how congressional 
representation can serve to influence the public by opposing the president.  These 
individuals include both members of the electorate and MCs.  The public's cognitive 
processing of MC actions may be guided by a growing dissatisfaction with the President, 
and MCs may offer substantively different actions to the deliberation, which in turn 
interacts with the public in a way that affects their attitudes.  While there are many more 
actions included in the dataset in these years (1972-1974, 1978), the example of the types 
of actions in these sub-eras begins to paint a picture of the relationship between actions 
and attitudes about government.
--insert Table 2 about here--
While the graphical modeling paints the picture of the relationship between 
attitudes about government responsiveness, efficacy, and trust, it does not offer a 
sufficient test of the relationship.  The models in  Table 2 offer a test of each relationship, 
respectively.  The main effects indicate that there is a significant and positive relationship 
between the total number of congressional actions per legislative cycle and trust in 
government, the level of individual external efficacy, and attitudes about responsiveness.  
Congressional actions are positively significant when holding public interest at 0 for all 
three models, when controlling for the other effects.  This tells us that actions act as a 
contextual variable that influences all of these attitudes.  Further, the interaction of total
congressional actions and public interest is significant across all three models offering 
support to the theory that actions matter most for those with higher attentiveness to public 
affairs.
Collectively the models offer support to the contention that actions matter because 
they individually perform well.  The other explanatory and control variables are 
consistently significant across all three models, with some minor variation.  Therefore, 
the controls are actually demonstrating positive effect, but do not explain all of the 
variance, as the actions indicators in each model are still significant.  Given that there are 
over 20,000 cases in the pooled dataset and there are strong theoretical reasons to include 
all of the controls, it should be expected that controls are significant.  Their significance 
adds to the strength of the actions finding because it effectively controls for alternatives 
assuring that the relationship is not spurious.  Although all of the models perform well, 
the attitude about responsiveness model performs the best of the three as every variable in 
the model is significant at the 0.01 level.  The pseudo R2 improves in all three models by 
including actions as an explanatory variable, but shows the most improvement in the 
attitudes about responsiveness model.  The pseudo R2 for each of these models excluding 
the actions indicator is 0.012 for the trust model, .106 for the efficacy model, and 0.029 
for the attitude about responsiveness model.  As indicated in Table 2 the pseudo R2 for 
each is 0.024, 0.113,  and 0.054 respectively, when the actions indicator is included.
The relationship between public interest with efficacy, attitude about 
responsiveness, and trust in government is significantly positively related when holding 
congressional actions at 0 and controlling for the other effects.  This finding is interesting
because one may suspect that those who pay more attention to the actions of government 
would feel less favorable about government, but as the data indicates those who are most 
attentive feel more favorable.
The primary reason for including party identification in the models was not 
because there was an expected relationship between party identification and the outcome 
indicators, but rather to serve as a control for the effects of actions.  As previously 
mentioned, it should not be expected that increased actions by Democrats would be 
positively associated with the outcome indicators for those that identify with the 
Republican Party and vice versa.  It is intriguing that Republican identification and 
Independent identification (except in the trust model) is positively associated with all 
three indicators when controlling for other factors, considering that the Democrats 
controlled Congress throughout the time period in the sample.  Democratic Party 
identification is positively and significantly related to all three attitudes, but it is 
important to remember that these are simply controls and not explanatory factors.
Some speculation of party effects may still be offered using the results of the 
difference in affect indicator.  It seems that affect toward the parties and party 
identification are distinct from each other in the context of these outcome indicators 
because there is a positive relationship with Democratic identification but a negative 
relationship with increased favorability of Democrats over Republicans.  Those that 
strongly identify with a party are likely to give them higher thermometer scores ( r =
0.461, p ≤ .01), and Republican identification is significantly positively correlated with 
the Republican thermometer (r = 0.356, p ≤  .01), while giving the opposition
lower scores (Democrat Identification is significantly negatively correlated with the 
Republican thermometer (r = -0.357,  p ≤ .01), and Republican identification is 
significantly negatively correlated with the Democratic thermometer (r = -0.443, p ≤
.01), so thermometer readings and party identification are correlated, but those that 
identify with the Republican Party, are likely to have higher efficacy, trust, and feel better 
about government responsiveness.  This is perhaps a result of differences between 
Republicans and Democrats in the context of the socio-economic status.  Because there is 
a positive and significant relationship between socio-economic status and all three 
indicators, and identifying as a Republican is positively correlated with socio-economic 
status (r = 0.180, p ≤ 0.01) and identifying as a Democrat is negatively correlated with 
socio-economic status (r =-0.128, p ≤  0.01 ), perhaps, the positive relationship between 
affect toward Republicans and the three outcomes is actually a product of the mediating 
effect of socio-economic status.  Further, the difference between Democrats and 
Republicans in socio-economic status is significant (Pearson X2 = 673.984,  p ≤ 0.01).
These results do not contradict previous findings that income is positively 
associated with efficacy (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Shrivastava 1989).  The 
importance of the socio-economic status indicator in this model is that it does not absorb 
the variance in the perceptions outcome variables eliminating the significant relationship 
with congressional actions.  Attitudes about the prospective personal finances of the 
respondents are consistent with these findings.  As individual's attitude about their 
financial future improves, it appears that there is a positive effect on their attitude about 
responsiveness and their level of trust.
Discussion
This study has sought to paint a picture of the relationship between congressional 
actions and the citizenry's perspectives on government.  In doing so, evidence has been 
provided to demonstrate the positive relationship between congressional actions and 
individual attitudes about responsiveness, external efficacy, and trust in government.  
This is a dynamic relationship that depends on the attentiveness of individuals to public 
affairs.  These findings speak towards theories that contend that the public is unaware of 
the daily business of Congress.  While only an alert stratum of the public may be aware 
of some of the details of Congress's daily business, it appears that the aggregation of the 
actions that make up this business actually penetrate the consciousness of the public.  
Both Congress and the public are engaged in open deliberation, and demonstrating that 
the actions of MCs have an impact on public opinion supports the contention that the 
deliberation of each is not mutually exclusive.  Congress and the public are 
simultaneously engaged in the same deliberation.
This finding is particularly important because it suggests that what Congress does 
matters in the formation of public opinion.  Therefore, models of public opinion should 
consider the behavior of MCs when describing the formation and development of 
individual attitudes.  Most models of public opinion consider individual socio -
psychological factors but do not consider the actual behavior of representatives.  This 
study does not contend that the factors are not important but rather that we can have a 
more full understanding of the dynamics of public opinion if we consider
both factors.  The suggestion here is not that every model of public opinion includes a 
measure of actions, but rather, that every model should consider the behavior of political 
figures when seeking to explain an attitude that is directly related to the behavior of 
political figures.  Efficacy, trust, and attitudes about responsiveness are all about 
perceptions of the actions of government.  Therefore, it makes sense that the actions of 
government would have an effect of attitudes about the actions of government.
One potential weakness of this study is that it fails to account how the actions of 
the president, judiciary, or other political figures may influence public perspectives on 
government.  Given that the outcome indicators measure general attitudes toward 
government, and the theory contends that governmental actions are consequential, it 
should be expected that actions of political figures outside of Congress would be 
consequential as well.  While this may be the case, the exclusion of these measures does 
not take away from the power of the findings.  The fact that these measures are not 
included adds to the power of the finding because it implies that actions of Congress 
alone seem to push public opinion, but if the theory is accurate, an index of actions across 
all branches would explain even more of the variance.   
While the findings here do indicate a relationship, the causality argument is still 
quite tenuous.  Because the actions indicators are aggregate and are not broken down by 
district, while the public opinion indicators are at the individual level, individual effects 
cannot be directly ascertained.  Another data gathering project could offer such 
indicators.  Regardless of this shortcoming, the contextual aggregate relationship appears 
to be significant suggesting that individual level data may reveal the same relationship, 
but again, further data gathering is necessary to flesh out the nature of the relationship 
between actions and public opinion.
As normative theorists have contended that the public sphere is the domain of our 
social life where such a thing as public opinion can be formed, these findings have given 
support to the idea that the actions of Congress reside in this domain.  Foucault's 
assertion that the state has influence over the realm of deliberation is perhaps true, but not 
in the way in which he argued.  Rather than being a suppressing effect on public
deliberation, Congress seems to have a positive effect on the way people feel about the 
structure within which they exist.  Individual opinion is not autonomous from the 
structure within which it exists, and the actions that ensue within this structure
are relevant.  While the evidence presented here does not either offer support for the 
existence or non-existence of a public sphere, it does support the contention that the 
actions of Congress are an integral part of the formation of public opinion.
While Mayhew (2000) primarily sought to detail patterns in the actions of 
members with the goal of bringing further understanding to the nature of congressional 
behavior, his approach opened the door for this study, and potentially, a host of other 
inquiries into both the impact of these actions within the broader public sphere and within 
the legislature itself.  This study is only a preliminary look at the potential implications of 
this new and innovative way of viewing Congress.  More research can be done in the area 
of the transmission of information regarding these actions through social networks.  For 
instance, it is likely that those who have stronger ties and more politicized social 
networks may be more influenced.  More research can be done in other areas such as the 
effects of the dynamics of actions and participation.  Potentially, participation may 
increase with actions.  Fluctuations in actions may also be related to vote choice.  Cycles 
with high actions dominated by one party may lead to increased support at the voting 
booth.  The areas for potential research are bountiful.  Mayhew's unique perspective on 
Congress has offered a new approach and research agenda.  For now, it can be clearly 
stated that there is a public reaction to congressional actions.

Appendix- Types of Actions
The actions included in Mayhew's data set fit in the following categories: moves on 
foreign policy, move to block presidential efforts, member is mentioned as a leader, 
member tries to pass or block a bill, member's name is affixed to a bill, member's name is 
affixed to something other than bill, big speech, filibuster, member stood alone on some 
matter, tipping vote, member disclosed something of importance, member takes part in 
presidential appointment, member takes part in process to impeach or censure member of 
executive branch or judiciary, member takes part in process to censure or expel another 
member of Congress, member was alleged to have done something illegal or unethical, 
member was censured or expelled, member resigned, member represented a tiny party or 
unpopular ideology, member takes part in action to adjust rules, member takes part in 
action regarding procedural relations between the executive and legislative branch, 
member takes part in an investigation, member serves on a commission, member 
performs a judicial, administrative, or diplomatic role not envisioned by the Constitution 
as a congressional role, member has notable race or ethnicity, member engages in 
distributive politics, actor is chair of committee, member is mentioned to be on a 
committee, member is associated with a special committee, member advises president, 
member speaks for administration, member is appointed to position by president, member 
is appointed to cabinet position, member runs for leadership position in House or Senate, 
member runs for or is considered for president or vice-president, member takes action to 
help decide who will be the presidential selection, member takes part in party convention, 
member is important figure in state or local organization, member takes part in activity 
not addressed by preceding five categories, member takes part in action to mobilize 
public, member does something associated with congressional election, and member 
writes a politically relevant book, newspaper article, or magazine article.
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Table 1- Correlation and Factor Analysis of Outcome Indicators
Trust Efficacy Responsiveness Component 
Vector
Trust -- 0.288* 0.364* 0.735
Efficacy -- -- 0.350* 0.723
Responsiveness -- -- -- 0.778
Source: American National Election Studies 1964-1988.  2-tailed test  p ≤ .01. Notes: Correlation 
is Pearson's  and the component is extracted using Principal Component Analysis.
Table 2- Pooled Time-Series Output of Attitudes and Actions
Explanatory Variables
Trust Efficacy Responsiveness
Congressional Actions 0.001** 0.001** 0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public Interest             0.106** 0.120** 0.106**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Actions * Public Interest 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Control Variables
Democrat Identification     0.336**    0.492**   0.587**    
(0.115)    (0.119)   (0.115)  
Republican Identification   0.388**    0.592**   0.625**  
(0.116)    (0.120)    (0.116)  
Independent Identification  0.074     0.242*    0.349**   
(0.119)    (0.123)   (0.119)  
Affect Toward Parties       -0.002**     -0.001*   -0.002**   
(0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001)  
Socio-Economic Status      0.018**   0.253**   0.074**   
(0.006)    (0.007) (0.006)  
Prospective Finances        0.094**     0.142**   0.211**
(0.015)    (0.016)  (0.015)  
X2 504.511 2473.904 1187.807
df 9 9 9
Nagelkerke pseudo R2      0.024 0.113 0.054
N 24,263
Source: American National Election Studies 1964-1988 and David Mayhew's data.
Notes:  Coefficients are estimated using ordered logistical regression, missing values are
mean imputed. 2-tailed test p ≤  .05, **p ≤  .01.  (S.E.) S.E. < (0.001) reads (0.000). The 
1988 legislative cycle was excluded from the trust model because the indicator was 
available in that year of the ANES study.
Figure 1- Actions by Legislative Cycle
Source: American National Election Studies 1964-88 and Mayhew's action
data http://pantheon.yale.edu/dmayhew/datasets.html.
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Figure 2- Actions, Efficacy, Trust, 
and Attitudes about Responsiveness
Source: ANES 1964-1988 and Mayhew's Action Data available at
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~dmayhew/datasets.html.
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Endnotes
                                               
i These data along with a codebook can be obtained at David Mayhew's webpage at 
http://pantheon.yale.edu/dmayhew/datasets.html.
ii It is important to note the difference between internal and external efficacy to provide a 
clear explanation of what will be measured. Internal efficacy is an individual's belief that 
she has the general ability to influence the system. It has
been asserted that the two are inseparable (Balch 1974), but others have proposed methods of separating the 
two (Shaffer 1981; Abramson 1982; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991). Niemi, Craig, and Mattei were critical 
of the ANES items measuring internal efficacy.  The measure of external efficacy is sufficient for this study 
because it is separate from the internal measures in ANES that they demonstrated to be insufficient.
